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Abstract
On 17 April 2014, the Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions was 
accepted by the European Parliament and sent to the EU Council of Ministers 
for final approval. In addition, a Recommendation was adopted in 2013 on 
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms 
in the Member States to meet the need for a coherent European approach to 
antitrust private enforcement. This package comes at a time when private antitrust 
enforcement is rapidly evolving in a number of Member States. At the same time 
however, it establishes several legal solutions that do not fit well with existing 
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national instruments. The aim of this article is to address, in particular, Portuguese 
and Polish experiences on a number of specific issues surrounding antitrust private 
enforcement, such as collective redress and contingency fees. Some doubts will also 
be raised concerning the solutions established in the European package, suggesting 
that national experiences should not be overlooked.
Résumé
Le 17 avril 2014, la proposition de la directive relative aux actions antitrust en 
dommages et intérêts a été acceptée par le Parlement européen et envoyé au Conseil 
de l’UE pour l’adoption finale. En outre, une recommandation a été adoptée en 
2013 sur des principes communs applicables aux méchanismes de recours collectif 
en cassation et en réparation dans les États membres pour répondre à la nécessité 
d’une approche européenne cohérente à l’application privée antitrust. Ce paquet 
est livré à un moment où l’application privée antitrust évolue rapidement dans un 
certain nombre d’États membres. Mais en même temps, il établit plusieurs solutions 
juridiques qui ne correspondent pas bien avec les instruments nationaux existants. 
Le but de cet article est d’examiner, en particulier, les expériences portugais et 
polonais sur un certain nombre de questions spécifiques entourant l’application 
privée antitrust, tels que le recours collectif en cessation et des honoraires. Des 
doutes seront également soulevés concernant les solutions établies dans le cadre 
du paquet européen, en suggèrant que les expériences nationales ne doivent pas 
être négligées.
Classifications and key words: private enforcement; antitrust damages; EU 
competition rules; Commission package; collective redress; contingency fees
I. Antitrust private enforcement in the EU context
In the United States of America, private enforcement of antitrust is 
usually considered a mature system1 which constitutes more than 90% of 
all antitrust cases. However, even though it apparently lacks an empirical 
1 In the ironic words of Albert Foer and Jonathan Cuneo, the “US in undoubtedly the leader 
in private enforcement, but much of the world seems to interpret the US experience as a ‘toxic 
litigation cocktail’ to be avoided rather than emulated”, The International Handbook on Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law, ed. by A. Foer and J.W. Cuneo, Edward Elgar Publishing 2012, 
p. xii. In the European context, on the other hand, the view that public enforcement would be 
much better than private enforcement was, apparently, well developed at least in the beginning 
of the EU; see, for instance, W.P.J. Wils, “Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged 
in Europe?” (2003) 26(3) World Competition 473.
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basis2, there is a common criticism of private actions, particularly class action, 
in that settlements are “judicial blackmail”3 based not on the merit of the 
action but rather on the fear of an unpredictable judgement. In the light of 
the above, EU policy-makers should proceed cautiously in adopting American 
antitrust principles and the instrument of class action. In fact, while its litigation 
culture and the characteristics of US civil procedure have indeed favoured 
a well-developed system of private enforcement, they have, nevertheless, also 
allowed some excesses which are difficult to revert.
By contrast, competition law has been mainly enforced by public authorities 
(DG Competition)4 in the European Union. Nevertheless, the Commission 
has, apparently, encouraged private antitrust enforcement for several years 
now, in order to strengthen the effectiveness of competition rules and optimize 
the use of its scarce resources5. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) ruled in the Courage Crehan case6 that full effectiveness of antitrust 
rules would “be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim 
damages for loss caused to him” by conducts liable to restrict competition. 
Victim compensation and deterrence would, therefore, be the aims of private 
damages actions, which need to be strengthened in order to overcome the state 
of “astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment”7 of private enforcement 
in Europe (even if recent research may challenge those conclusions8). 
According to the Commission, up to an estimated 20 billion EUR per year 
are not recovered through the EU in damages from competition infringements9. 
2 According to R.H. Lande this “view provides no systematic empirical basis for its factual 
predicates”, cf. “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” [in:] The International 
Handbook…, op. cit., p. 4, note 6.
3 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
4 A.P. Komninos, “Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? 
Overlap?” (2006) 3(1) Competition Law Review 6.
5 European Commission Green Paper, “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules”, 19.12.2005, COM (2006) 672 final and the previous Ashurst Report “Study on the 
conditions of claims for damages in case of infringements of EC Competition rules”, available 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf 
(20.05.2014).
6 ECJ judgment of 20 September 2001, C-453/99, ECR I-6297, paras 26-27.
7 Ashurst study, op. cit., p. 1. 
8 According to C. Hodges, in contrast with the Ashurst study, the findings of the research 
reported in the book edited by B. Rodgers (Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement 
and Collective Redress across the EU, Wolters Kluwer, International Competition Law Series, 
2012), show “that there is considerably more private enforcement of competition law than had 
been previously imagined”), cf. “Fast, Effective and Low Redress: How do public and private 
enforcement and ADR compare?” [in:] Competition Law Comparative…, op. cit., p. 255.
9 N. Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, White Paper on Antitrust 
Damages Actions, Brussels 4.11.2008, p. 3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
speeches/text/juri_speech_en.pdf (20.05.2014).
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Similarly, out of the 54 final cartel and antitrust prohibition decisions taken 
by the Commission in the period 2006–2012 “only 15 were followed by one 
or more follow-on actions for damages in one or more Member States”. The 
majority of the latter was brought in a limited number of countries only, 
mainly the UK, Germany and the Netherlands10.
In this context, it was not surprising that the European Commission issued 
on 11 June 2013 a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union11 (hereafter: Damages Directive). The draft 
Directive’s first aim is, on one hand, to “optimize” the interaction between 
private and public enforcement, notably as regards the protection of leniency 
programmes. On the other hand, it is to ensure effective damages actions 
before national courts of EU Member States. On 17 April 2014, the Proposal 
of the Damages Directive was accepted by the European Parliament and 
sent to the EU Council of Ministers for final approval. To meet the need 
for a coherent European approach to private enforcement of competition 
law12, the Commission adopted in addition a non-binding Communication 
and a Practical Guide on quantifying of harm in antitrust infringements13, and 
a Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law (hereafter: Recommendation)14. This 
package comes at a time when private antitrust enforcement is rapidly 
evolving in some Member States. It establishes, however, several solutions 
that do not fit well with existing national instruments including Portuguese 
experiences on the model of collective redress and Polish practice regarding 
contingency fees.
10 Commission Staff Working Document: Impact assessment report - Damages actions for 
breach of the EU antitrust rules Accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council, Strasbourg, 11.06.2013 SWD (2013) 203 final no. 52.
11 COM(2013) 404 final, (Damages Directive). Not yet Published in the Official Journal 
as of 11.10.2014. 
12 Although the Recommendation applies to “consumer protection, competition, 
environment protection, protection of personal data, financial services legislation and investor 
protection [and] in any other areas where collective claims for injunctions or damages in respect 
of violations of the rights granted under Union law would be relevant” (para 7), this paper will 
focus on competition issues.
13 C (2013) 3440, 11.06.2013.
14 2013/396/EU, OJ L 201/60, 26.07.2013.
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II. Collective redress 
1. Model of collective redress – the Portuguese experience
One of the key issues of the debate concerning the enhancement of private 
enforcement of competition law concerns “class actions”. Class actions played 
a central role in the American system on collective redress for antitrust 
infringements, but raise several doubts in the EU context. 
According to the Commission, collective redress is “a procedural 
mechanism that allows, for reasons of procedural economy and/or efficiency 
of enforcement, many similar legal claims to be bundled into a single court 
action”15. It has several advantages, such as facilitating access to justice in 
cases where low damages are not worth pursuing through individual claims. 
However, those measures must not attract abusive litigation and should not 
provide any economic incentives to bring speculative claims (as is the case in 
the US)16.
To attain those goals, the Recommendation puts forward a set of principles 
relating to judicial as well as out-of-court collective redress, that should be 
common across the EU, taking into account the legal traditions of EU Member 
States and the need to prevent abuses. One of the main concerns of the 
Recommendation relates to the legal standing necessary to bring a collective 
action. The Commission speaks for an opt-in approach to representative 
actions which contrasts the opt-out system effective in the US and some 
Member States, including Portugal.
Clearly, a representative action is “brought by a representative entity (can 
also be a public authority) on behalf of a defined group of individuals or legal 
persons who claim to have been harmed by the same alleged infringement”17. It 
can follow the opt-out model where the judgement is binding on all individuals 
that belong to the defined group except for those who explicitly opted out. 
Alternatively, it can follow the opt-in model where the judgement is binding 
on those who opted in, while all other individuals remain free to pursue their 
damages claims individually18. The Commission favours the opt-in model even 
if experience shows that it is not very effective as claimants are usually lazy, 
15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Towards 
a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress” (hereafter: Communication), COM 
(2013) 401 final, para. 1.2.
16 Communication, para 3.
17 Communication, para 3.3.
18 Communication, para 3.4.
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especially when damages are low, and will thus fail to opt-in19. The opt-in 
model is favoured by the Commission because it is compatible with the legal 
traditions of the Member States, respects the freedom of potential claimants to 
decide whether to take part in the litigation or not, and avoids abuses, such as 
overcompensating class representatives20. In fact, opt-out group actions seem 
to be most useful where individual claims are difficult to prove or when the 
value of such claims is too low to motivate consumers to participate, reducing, 
in addition, transaction and information costs21. Furthermore, recent surveys 
on relevant American jurisprudence show that the standpoint taken by the 
Commission fails to consider the evolution of the jurisprudence of US Federal 
Courts which tries to establish “strict safeguards” to minimize “the risks of 
‘unfairness’ and ‘defendant’s blackmail’”22.
Nevertheless, the Recommendation favours the opt-in model and the 
Commission has already explained that “any exception to this principle, by law 
or by court order, should be duly justified by reasons of sound administration 
of justice”23.
Portugal is one of the EU Member States that has an opt-out collective 
redress model called ‘Ação Popular’ (Popular Action, hereafter: PA). The 
PA has not been used frequently, even if it has been considered “the most 
extensive form of collective action based on the ‘opt-out model’ available in 
the EU”24.
The PA is mentioned in Article 52(3) of the Portuguese Constitution: 
“Everyone shall be granted the right of popular actions, to include the right 
to apply for the adequate compensation for an aggrieved party or parties, in 
19 Towards…, op. cit., pp. 11–12. In fact, studies show that the participation rate in the 
opt-in model is usually less than 1% and in the opt-out model more than 97%. See BEUC, The 
European Consumers’ Association, “European Group Action Ten Golden Rules”, at R. Gaudet, 
“Turning a blind eye: the Commission’s rejection of opt-out class actions overlooks Swedish, 
Norwegian, Danish and Dutch experience” (2009) 30(3) European Competition Law Review 108.
20 These arguments have already been presented by the Commission in the White Paper, 
but – as Gaudet already criticized – the Commission “did not explain how this might occur”, 
R. Gaudet, “Turning…”, op. cit., p. 107–108.
21 J. Douglas Richards, “Aggregation of claims” [in:] The International Handbook…, op. cit., 
p. 129.
22 A. Andreangeli, “A view from across the Atlantic: Recent developments in the Case-
Law of the US Federal Courts on Class Certification in Antitrust Cases” [in:] Competition 
Law Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress across the EU, Wolters Kluwer, 
International Competition Law Series 2012, (ed.) B. Rodgers, p. 249.
23 Communication, para 1.3.
24 C. Leskinen, “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules” (2011) 
8(1) The Competition Law Review 91, who mentions, besides Portugal, the existence of opt-out 
collective actions in the Netherlands and Denmark. See also Gaudet, “Turning…”, op. cit., 
p. 111.
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such cases and under such terms as the law may determine either personally 
or via associations that purport to defend the interests in question. That right 
shall be exercised namely to (…) promote the prevention, cessation or judicial 
prosecution of offences against public health, consumer rights, the quality of 
life or the preservation for environment and the cultural heritage”. 
This constitutional right was implemented by Law 83/95 of 31 August 1995 
(Popular Action Act, hereafter: PAA). It should be noted that the PAA has 
a broad scope and that the list of protected interests contained therein is not 
exhaustive25. However, although the PAA is applicable to the protection of 
diffuse collective and homogenous individual interests, it does not explicitly 
refer to the protection of competition. Nevertheless, the compensation of 
damages arising from antitrust infringements can be sought through the PA 
mechanism as the list of interests in Article 1 PAA is not exhaustive and the 
Portuguese Supreme Court did not refuse that solution26. 
Special procedural rules apply also, different from common declaratory 
actions, concerning collection of evidence, suspensory effect, and court costs. 
Article 17 PAA provides that “[i]n the popular action and within the key issues 
defined by the parties, it is up to the judge’s own initiative to collect evidence, 
and [the judge] is not bound by the initiative of the parties”. Article 18 PAA 
adds that “[e]ven if a particular appeal has no suspensive effect, in general 
terms, the judge may, in a class action, give it that effect, to prevent damage 
irreparable or difficult to repair”. Finally, Article 20 PAA concerns court costs 
and expenses. Accordingly, the claimant is exempt from the payment of costs 
if the application is partially granted; if the claim is totally unsuccessful, the 
claimant will be obliged to pay an amount fixed by the judge between 10% 
and 50% of the costs that would be normally payable, taking into account the 
claimant’s economic situation and the formal or substantive reason for the 
25 On this topic see H. Sousa Antunes, “Class Actions, Group Litigation and Other Forms 
of Collective Litigation (Portuguese Report)” (2009) 622 The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 161, S. Oliveira Pais, “A união faz a força? Breves reflexões 
sobre os mecanismos colectivos de reparação no contexto da aplicação privada do direito da 
concorrência da União” (artigo) [in:] Liber Amicorum em Homenagem ao Professor Doutor Mota 
Campos, Coimbra editora 2013, p. 873; S. Oliveira Pais, “Entre clemência e responsabilidade 
– Uma história de sucesso? – Ac. do Tribunal de Justiça (Grande Secção), de 14 de Junho 
de 2011, Proc. C-360/09” (2012) 37 Cadernos de Direito Privado 1; L. Rossi, M. Sousa Ferro, 
“Private enforcement of competition law in Portugal (II): Actio Populari – Facts, fictions and 
dreams” (2013) IV(13) Revista de Concorrência e Regulação 35. 
26 In fact, we agree with L. Rossi and M. Sousa Ferro when they suggest that the Supreme 
Court in its decision of 7.10.2003 confirmed that the Popular Action may apply to promote 
competition, cf., “Private enforcement…”, op. cit., pp. 49–50. In addition, it should be mentioned 
that as there are no specific provisions concerning the enforcement of competition law, general 
provisions, such as Articles 483 and 562 (rules on tort liability) of the Portuguese Civil Code, 
will apply.
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dismissal. Furthermore, it is the court that establishes attorney fees to reflect 
the complexity and the amount of the claim (Article 21 PAA).
In terms of substantive issues, legal standing and how compensation should 
be decided in the PA are probably the most controversial concepts in the 
Portuguese context. 
Standing to initiate a PA is granted to: 1) any citizen, 2) a legally constituted 
association or foundation (as long as it has legal personality, its powers expressly 
include interests covered by the PA, and if it is not engaged in any type of 
professional business competing with companies or liberal professionals), 
and 3) the public prosecutor’s office, which may replace the claimants if the 
contested behaviour endangers the interests involved (Articles 2 and 3 PAA). 
In addition, the application is subject to preliminary assessment and may be 
dismissed by the judge if its success is considered unlikely (Article 13 PAA). 
But, if the action does proceed, the claimants will represent all holders of 
rights or interests who suffered damages as a result of the given antitrust 
infringements and did not opt-out.
It is worth stressing that companies, even small and medium ones, do not 
have direct legal standing and can only seek compensation through individuals, 
associations or foundations. 
It is also worth noting that the PAA does not establish a minimum number 
of claimants, as opposed to the American class action experience. In fact, 
in the US, Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes certain 
requirements for a case to proceed as an opt-out class action. These include: 
1) numerosity (“the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable”27); 2) commonality (“there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class”28); 3) typicality (“the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”29); 4) adequacy 
of representation (“the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class30); 5) predominance (“questions of law or 
fact common to the members of the class predominant over any questions 
affecting only individual members”31); and 6) superiority (“a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy”32). Analysing these requirements in the light of US experiences, 
J. Douglas Richard concluded that predominance is the most controversial 
27 Rule 23 (a) (1).
28 Rule 23 (a) (2).
29 Rule 23 (a) (3).
30 Rule 23 (a) (4).
31 Rule 23 (b) (3).
32 Rule 23 (b) (3).
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requirement in antitrust class actions. The easiest to satisfy is numerosity, 
conventionally mentioned as benchmark forty “overcharged purchasers”33 
The PAA did not set up all these requirements – it did not establish 
a minimum number of claimants. Still, there is apparently a general consensus 
that legal standing “should be restricted to holders of “diffuse collective” or 
“homogeneous individual” interests that are threatened or harmed”34. As such, 
the numerosity requirement was not established. The question will become 
increasingly relevant as the PA mechanism may, and should, encompass 
nowadays also the protection of effective competition.
On the other hand, the PAA, like traditional American class actions, tries 
to protect the interests of those who have not opted out, controlling the 
adequacy of representation. The need to ensure that the claimant acts as 
a representative, and does not favour its own interests sacrificing the interests 
of other members of the class, justifies some of the solutions established in 
the PAA. First, within the scope of judicial review, the Public Prosecutor, 
besides representing the State or other public authorities authorized by law, 
may substitute the applicant of a withdrawn suit. The Public Prosecutor may 
also act against transactions or injurious behaviours concerning the interests 
of those that did not opt-out (Article 16 PAA). Second, the judge plays 
a fundamental role in the application of the Portuguese mechanism as he/she 
may dismiss the petition on the ground that “it is manifestly unlikely to merit 
the application” (Article 13 PAA). The judge can collect evidence and is not 
bound by the initiative of the parties (Article 17 PAA), he/she decides on the 
court costs and expenses, as well as on the need to give the action a suspensive 
effect in order to prevent irreparable damages or difficult to repair (Article 18 
PAA). The Portuguese solutions, apparently, fit well with those proposed by 
some authors that support “strong judicial checks as to admissibility of each 
action” in order to avoid abuses such as opportunistic behaviour of the lawyer’ 
representing the class35.
The other controversial issue in the PAA is how to decide compensation 
for damages when only some of the injured parties are individually identified. 
According to Article 22(2) PAA, “[c]ompensation for infringement of interests 
of holders not individually identified is fixed in total” by the court. In addition, 
the right to damages shall be extinguished within three years from the final 
judgment that has recognized the damage; the rights corresponding to 
prescribed amounts shall be delivered to the Ministry of Justice, which will 
create a special account and allocate the payment of attorney fees and to 
support access to the courts (Article 22.º n.ºsº4 and n.º 5 PAA). 
33 J. Douglas Richards, “Aggregation of…”, op. cit., p. 129.
34 H.S. Antunes, “Class Actions…”, op. cit., p. 163.
35 A. Andreangeli, “A view from…”, op. cit., p. 247.
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Doubts arise, however, about the possibility of allowing an entity another 
other than the court to distribute the total compensation among the injured 
parties that come forward in the prescribed 3 year period. The PAA does not 
clarify this issue. It has been suggested36 that one of the solutions would be 
to apply Article 31 of the Securities Code, which provides: “[T]he conviction 
obtained should indicate the entity in charge of the receipt and management of 
the indemnity due to those shareholders not individually identified, according 
to the circumstances (…)”. In competition cases, consumer associations might 
be the most adequate entity to distribute the total amount of the compensation. 
However, as the law does not provide such solution, this will depend on the 
court’s decision.
Finally, concerning the practical relevance of the PAA, consumer associations 
were able to initiate law suits in Portugal and the instrument of the PA has 
been successfully used for that purpose. The most relevant case here is DECO 
vs Portugal Telecom, where competition law was invoked, even if the case was 
decided on other grounds. In this case, the telecoms incumbent imposed an 
unlawful “activation charge” on all clients concerning all phone calls; DECO 
(a consumer association) sued Portugal Telecom on behalf of all these clients. 
In spite of the argument presented by DECO that the contested practice 
should be considered an abuse of a dominant position, Portuguese courts37 
overlooked that argument and decided to consider the application successful 
on other grounds38. Following this judgement, DECO and Portugal Telecom 
arrived at a settlement at an estimated 120 million EUR. This amount was 
not, however, paid in direct payments but in free national calls for all Portugal 
Telecom’s clients on several consecutive Sundays.
2. Contingency fees – the Polish experience
Another concern raised by the Commission in its Recommendation 
involves lawyers’ remuneration. Section 29 of the Recommendation states that 
„[t]he Member States should ensure that the lawyers’ remuneration and the 
method by which it is calculated do not create any incentive to litigation that 
is unnecessary from the point of view of the interest of any of the parties”. 
However, litigation would always go against the interests of at least one party 
36 S. Rossi, M. Sousa Ferro, “Private enforcement…”, op. cit., pp. 78–79.
37 The case took approximately 4 years, finally the Supreme Court decided in 2003: Supreme 
Court Decision – Portuguese Consumer Protection Association (DECO) v Portugal Telecom 
(7.10.2003).
38 Note, however, that, as Rossi and Ferro argued – cf. cit., p. 66, implicitly this judgement 
confirmed that the PA may be used in antitrust private enforcement cases.
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involved in the dispute (especially since those interests are diverse). Litigation 
should be a last resort because of the high legal costs involved and protracted 
proceedings. It seems that it would clarify more than it would confuse to say 
that lawyers’ remuneration should not create an incentive to start litigation 
unnecessary for (sound) administration of justice.
Section 30 of the Recommendation specifies further that „[t]he Member 
States should not permit contingency fees which risk creating such an incentive. 
The Member States that exceptionally allow for contingency fees should provide 
for appropriate national regulation of those fees in collective redress cases, 
taking into account in particular the right to full compensation of the members 
of the claimant party”. In the Communication, contingency fees are depicted 
in three aspects: 1) as one of the features of the US legal system that “have 
made class actions a particularly powerful instrument that is, however, feared 
by those on the defending side, namely trade and industry as it can be used 
as a forceful tool to compel them to settle a case, which may not necessarily 
be well-founded” (para 2.2.2); 2) as one of the details noted by the European 
Parliament in its 2012 Resolution39 and spoken of by some stakeholders who 
responded the Commission’s 2011 public consultation on collective redress; 
they consider excluding contingency fees from the scope of the EU horizontal 
framework as an important safeguard against abusive litigation (paras 2.3 and 
3.9.1); and 3) as a beneficial feature, that is, a useful method of financing 
collective actions – according to other stakeholders (para 3.9.1). 
The concept of contingency fees has recently been established in Poland in 
the legal framework for collective redress. Group actions and their features, 
such as contingency fees, emerged in Poland a few years ago. The Polish 
Parliament adopted on 17 December 2009 the Act on the Pursuit of Claims 
in Group Proceedings (hereafter: APCGP)40. This legislative development was 
in line with the Commission’s continuous efforts to facilitate access to justice, 
including effective redress. Just one year before, the Commission published its 
Green Paper on consumer collective redress41. The Polish legislature chose an 
opt-in model, as opposed to the opt-out system which exists in some European 
countries, including Portugal as shown above. The possibility to opt-in and to 
benefit from collective redress in accordance with the APCGP does not apply 
to group lawsuits seeking to protect personal rights42. 
39 The European Parliament’s resolution “Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress” of 2.02.2012, 2011/2089(INI), available at http://parltrack.euwiki.org/
dossier/2011/2089%28INI%29 (1.08.2014).
40 Journal of Laws 2010 No. 7, item 44. The Act came into force on 19.07.2010.
41 COM(2008)794, 27.11.2008. 
42 See in more detail A. Piszcz, “‘Class Actions’ in the Court Culture of Eastern Europe” 
[in:] L. Ervo, A. Nylund (eds), The Future of Civil Litigation – Access to Courts and Court 
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Article 5 APCGP provides that “[t]he agreement regulating the remuneration 
of the legal representative may determine the remuneration proportionally to 
the amount awarded in favour of the claimant, but not beyond 20% of the said 
amount”. American-style contingency fees do not seem to fit into the Polish 
legal environment. Polish ethics rules place limits on the use of contingency 
fees. Remuneration proportional to the amount awarded in favour of a claimant 
cannot be used as the only form of remuneration. However, it is permissible 
to agree on an additional payment to accompany basic remuneration, which 
would depend on the positive result of the proceedings. On the other hand, 
it is unclear – and even doubtful – whether contingency fees agreed upon 
pursuant to Article 5 APCGP can be charged to a losing defendant according 
to the “loser pays” principle. It seems that the court cannot charge more than 
the maximum amounts stipulated in the fees regulations43 with respect of 
individual actions44. 
The explanatory notes to the draft APCGP clarify that the legal basis for 
contingency fees was introduced because of the need to make professional 
lawyers interested in engaging in complex group proceedings45. Class counsel 
is expected to do a remarkable job of representing group interests. The authors 
Connected mediation in the Nordic Countries, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 
Cham 2014, pp. 368–369. 
43 Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 28.09.2002 regulating the issue of fees for 
advocates’ activities and incurring by the State Treasury the costs of unpaid pro bono legal 
aid (rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z dnia 3 października 2002 roku w sprawie opłat 
za czynności adwokackie oraz ponoszenia przez Skarb Państwa kosztów nieopłaconej pomocy 
prawnej udzielonej z urzędu), consolidated text Journal of Laws 2013, item 461; Regulation of 
the Minister of Justice of 28.09.2002 regulating the issue of fees for legal counsels’ activities and 
incurring by the State Treasury the costs of unpaid pro bono legal aid (rozporządzenie Ministra 
Sprawiedliwości z dnia 28 września 2002 roku w sprawie opłat za czynności radców prawnych 
oraz ponoszenia przez Skarb Państwa kosztów nieopłaconej pomocy prawnej udzielonej z urzędu), 
consolidated text Journal of Laws 2013, item 490. 
44 See also M. Sieradzka, Ustawa o dochodzeniu roszczeń w postępowaniu grupowym. 
Komentarz, Warszawa Wolters Kluwer 2010, pp. 143–144; T. Jaworski, P. Radzimierski, Ustawa 
o  dochodzeniu roszczeń w postępowaniu grupowym. Komentarz, Warszawa CH Beck 2010, 
pp. 165–166; T. Ereciński, P. Grzegorczyk, “Effective protection of diverse interests in civil 
proceedings on the example of Polish Act on Group Action” [in:] Recent trends in economy and 
efficiency of civil procedure, Vilnius University Press, Vilnius 2013, p. 38. On the other hand, 
P. Pietkiewicz is of the opinion that contingency fees cannot be charged to a losing defendant 
even in part; P. Pietkiewicz [in:] M. Rejdak, P. Pietkiewicz, Ustawa o dochodzeniu roszczeń 
w postępowaniu grupowym. Komentarz, LexisNexis, Warszawa 2011, p. 130.
45 See http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc6.nsf/opisy/1829.htm (1.08.2014). Still, sometimes 
explanatory notes to draft bills do not state in full the legal, policy and other reasons for its 
preparation (sometimes there are also some “hidden” reasons). Another question is whether 
one can have the comfort of believing that legislature is rational. 
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of the draft were afraid that few lawyers would be interested in taking on such 
cases unless they were financially incentivised by the APCGP itself. 
Might that view be considered naive? Such an assessment would be too 
harsh. First, it should be emphasised that the introduction of the APCGP 
did not cause a flood of group litigations in Polish courts. Newest statistics 
released by the Ministry of Justice46 reveal that 21 group action suits were 
filed in 2010 (all civil suits), increased to 38 (37 civil suits and one commercial 
suit) in 2011, and grew once more in 2012 totalling 39 (35 civil suits and four 
commercial suits). Further on, the statistics unveil a surprising new tendency: 
2013 has been a landmark year with only 22 group action suits (all civil suits). 
In addition, advancing group claims based specifically on competition law 
infringements seems extremely unpopular. Not only do injured persons fail 
to use their privileges under the APCGP, preferring to simply suffer their 
losses resulting from antitrust violations, they do not even turn to individual 
private antitrust actions, which have rarely been “tested” in Poland so far47. 
Polish consumers seem to recognise the advantages of being part of Groupon-
esque programmes, but they do not seem very eager to apply the “there is 
power in togetherness” logic to their claims48. The existence of a legal basis 
for contingency fees in group proceedings has not prevented the drop in 
the number of group action suits that has occurred after the first few court 
rulings on group cases were delivered, nor has it averted the apparent lack of 
collective antitrust actions. 
The second problem concerns the way in which the Commission “utilises” 
the right to full compensation in the Recommendation. Section 30 requires 
those Member States that decide to exceptionally allow for contingency fees 
to set out “appropriate” national rules governing their use in collective redress 
cases (is Article 5 APCGP “appropriate”?). In particular, the right to full 
compensation of the members of the claimant party should be taken into 
account. Many Member States, including Poland, recognise the principle of 
full compensation in their substantive civil laws. Moreover, its regulation is 
going to be harmonised. Yet this is going to happen in the field of private 
antitrust enforcement (see Article 2 section 1 of the Damages Directive). The 
Recommendation is intended to have a much broader scope of application. 
46 “Pozwy zbiorowe w latach 2010–2013”, http://isws.ms.gov.pl/pl/baza-statystyczna/opra 
cowania-wieloletnie/ (1.08.2014).
47 Compare A. Jurkowska-Gomułka, “Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Polish 
Courts: The Story of an (Almost) Lost Hope for Development” (2013) 6(8) YARS 110. See also 
A. Jurkowska, “Antitrust Private Enforcement – Case of Poland” (2008) 1(1) YARS 59 et seq.
48 A. Piszcz, “Has class-action culture already hit Poland?” [in:] M. Etel, I. Kraśnicka, 
A. Piszcz (eds), Court Culture – Conciliation Culture or Litigation Culture?, Białystok 2014, 
p. 138.
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The question then arises: does the Commission – placing the right to full 
compensation in Section 30 of the Recommendation (soft law instrument!) – 
want to introduce this right (principle) into all Member States through a back 
door? Or, perhaps, should this right be taken into account only by those 
Member States which already have it in their national laws but not by others? 
The Polish version of contingency fees (in group proceedings) should be 
defended, if only it could save the use of collective redress mechanisms in 
Poland. Does the Recommendation allow for any such “defence” by a Member 
State, other than simple disrespect for the Recommendation which is, after 
all, only a soft law instrument? A short review of the Recommendation leads 
to the conclusion that it seems to leave some “back doors” open for national 
solutions different from those being recommended by the Commission. 
One of them seems to lie in Section 2 of the Recommendation where it is 
suggested that the principles for collective redress mechanisms should “be 
common across the Union, while respecting the different legal traditions of 
the Member States”. The Commission seems thus to be willing to integrate 
its current visions for collective redress with national legal traditions of EU 
Member States. The longer contingency fees will exist in Poland, the stronger 
they might contribute to the Polish legal tradition. 
The second “back door” for exceptions to the principles set out by the 
Recommendation, by law or by court order, is envisaged in some instances 
where such exceptions are duly justified by reasons of sound administration 
of justice (see Sections 21, 22, 23 and recital 20 of the Preamble of the 
Recommendation). However, this rule refers only to the constitution of 
the claimant party and admissibility of collective actions, not to lawyers’ 
remuneration. Nevertheless, it will be very interesting to see how the notion 
of sound administration of justice will be interpreted. The question here is, in 
particular, whether it will be taken to mean that what is “sound administration 
of justice” is different in various Member States (like legal traditions are 
different) or that there is, in fact, only one standard thereof for all Member 
States (the “average”, a common denominator for e.g. Italian and Swedish 
administration of justice). 
Finally, there is an open “back door” in Section 30 of the Recommendation. 
But what does it mean to take “into account […] the right to full compensation”? 
In Poland, the fees regulations49 stipulate what maximum fees can be charged 
to a losing party by the court. Since those maximum amounts are relatively low 
in many categories of cases, it is often true that the actual fees paid to a lawyer 
are higher than the ones reimbursed later from the party obliged to do so by 
the court. Does it mean that Polish solutions regarding all court proceedings 
49 See footnote 43. 
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do not take into account the principle of full compensation? One should not 
underestimate here the value of another principle of civil law, namely the 
freedom of contract. It lets a party who ultimately wins a case to agree to 
pay its lawyers more than what the court can charge to the opposing party. 
So, why should it not be possible to do this in the form of contingency fees 
(in case of group proceedings)? Why should the latter be treated differently 
from the perspective of the right to full compensation? Surely, these questions 
are justified with regard to opt-in group proceedings. On the other hand, the 
opt-out model does not offer a comparable freedom of contract for group 
(class) members with respect to lawyers’ remuneration. It should be argued, 
however, that contingency legal fees may contribute to abusive litigation but 
only in conjunction with the opt-out system50. 
To sum it up, the Recommendation needs to be changed in some respects 
if it is to be accepted by all Member States. Adjusting their laws to the 
Recommendation would be a bit easier if at least the Damages Directive 
did not contradict the Commission’s emphasis on collective redress. Recital 
7 of the Preamble of the Recommendation lists competition and consumer 
protection alongside environmental protection, protection of personal 
data, financial services legislation and investor protection as areas where 
supplementary private enforcement of rights granted under EU law in the 
form of collective redress is of value. At the same time, however, Recital 
12 of the Preamble to the Damages Directive declares: “(…) This Directive 
should not require Member States to introduce collective redress mechanisms 
for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty (…)”. It is worth 
adding that the quoted text was already present in the very first version of the 
draft Damages Directive circulated at the same time as the publication of the 
Commission’s Recommendation on its website. 
III. Actions for damages based on breaches of EU competition rules
1. Prohibition of overcompensation
Pursuant to the above-mentioned Article 2 of the Damages Directive: 
“1. Member States shall ensure that any natural or legal person who has 
suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law is able to claim 
and to obtain full compensation for that harm.
50 See also summary of the Competition Law Association Panel Session “The dynamic between 
UK and EU Private Actions Reforms” of 9.09.2013, p. 4; http://www.competitionlawassociation.
org.uk/new/events.htm (1.08.2014). 
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2. Full compensation shall place a person who has suffered harm in the 
position in which that person would have been had the infringement not been 
committed. It shall therefore cover the right to compensation for actual loss 
and for loss of profit, plus payment of interest.
3. Full compensation under this Directive shall not lead to overcompensation, 
whether by means of punitive, multiple or other types of damages”.
The principle of full compensation is one of the major principles of civil 
law in continental Europe. Notably, exceptions to this principle exist for 
instance in the field of intellectual property protection. The most impressive 
examples of legal solutions capable of overcompensating persons injured by 
competition law infringement can be found outside continental Europe. In 
England and Wales, non-compensatory damages can be awarded in addition 
to compensatory damages51. One of the latest developments in English private 
antitrust enforcement was the judgment of the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(hereafter: CAT) related to a damages claim submitted by 2 Travel Group PLC 
(in liquidation) against Cardiff City Transport Services Limited52. It was the 
first CAT ruling to award antitrust damages concerning the infringement of 
the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position (in national law). At the 
same time, it was the first ruling (in England) to award exemplary damages to 
an applicant injured by an antitrust infringement. The applicant was awarded 
GBP 33.818,79 in compensatory damages plus exemplary damages of GBP 
60.000,00. One of the reasons behind such a decision was that the relevant 
national competition authority (hereafter: NCA) did not fine the defendant 
for the above infringement; the violation was qualified as conduct of minor 
significance. Of particular importance is the English standpoint that the 
principle of non bis in idem precludes the award of exemplary damages in 
cases where the defendants have already been fined (or had fines imposed 
and then reduced or commuted)53. 
All of the debate seems to centre on the function(s) of antitrust damages. 
According to the CAT, the imposition of fines and an award of exemplary 
damages serve the same aim: namely to punish and deter anti-competitive 
behaviour54. Not only should injured persons be compensated by infringers of 
competition rules, the latter should also be punished because they deserve it. 
Under English laws, courts that decide on antitrust damages are competent to 
51 See C.A. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA, OUP, New 
York 1999, p. 201. 
52 Judgment of 5.07.2012 in Case 1178/5/7/11. For more information visit http://www.
catribunal.org.uk/238-7662/Judgment.html (1.08.2014). 
53 See the CAT judgment of 5.07.2012, para. 491; R. Whish, Competition Law, Oxford NY 
OUP 2009, p. 303.
54 See the CAT judgment of 5.07.2012, para. 491.
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question the decision of the NCA that there was no need to punish and deter 
anti-competitive behaviour; courts are capable of making corrections thereto 
in the form of an award of exemplary damages. The EU moved towards the 
continental standard, namely the prohibition of overcompensation, whether 
by means of punitive, multiple or other types of damages, and England will 
be obliged to fully comply with the EU approach (unless it disregards the 
Recommendation). 
The Damages Directive shall set a very definite boundary between public 
and private antitrust enforcement. EU institutions do not want national courts 
to make the above-mentioned corrections to public enforcement decisions 
(with respect to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) – they do not want public 
antitrust enforcement functions to be complemented in the above manner. 
But is an absolute guarantee of the inviolability of the boundary between 
public and private antitrust enforcement necessary? Certainly, national courts 
should not be permitted to perform such a “corrective” function in a case of 
leniency-based immunity from fines. Private enforcement should not interfere 
with leniency programmes; it should not undermine the effectiveness of public 
antitrust enforcement. But if an NCA is able to desist from the imposition 
of fines because of the low turnover of an infringer (in such circumstances 
a  fine could neither punish nor deter anti-competitive behaviour), why not 
allow for an award of exemplary damages later when the court is deciding 
on an application for damages and the infringer’s financial standing is not as 
weak as it was earlier? 
As a rule, Polish laws do not seem to allow for overcompensation in private 
antitrust enforcement. However, also Polish legal provisions might generate 
legal interpretation problems in the light of Article 2 of the Damages Directive. 
First, there is still no unambiguous answer to the question identified under 
Article 2 APCGP, that is, whether standardisation of group claims can be seen 
as an exception to the principle of full compensation. If so, does it only allow 
for under-compensation or also for overcompensation55. Another problem 
that may appear in Poland after the implementation of the Damages Directive 
is how to treat cases where the infringement of EU competition rules in the 
Polish territory constitutes at the same time an act of unfair competition. 
In case of such conjunction, an injured person has the right to pursue 
claims determined by Article 18 of the Act of 1993 on Combating Unfair 
55 The insights into this problem are provided in e.g. T. Jaworski, P. Radzimierski, 
Ustawa o…, op. cit., p. 109 et seq.; M. Rejdak, P. Pietkiewicz, Ustawa o…, op. cit., p. 74 et seq.; 
A. Jurkowska-Gomułka, Publiczne i prywatne egzekwowanie zakazów praktyk ograniczających 
konkurencję, Warszawa Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Warszaw-
skiego 2013, p. 204.
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Competition56 including an award of an adequate amount for a determined 
social goal connected with the support of Polish culture or related to the 
protection of national heritage (where the act of unfair competition has been 
intentional). It seems that the focus here should be on an injured person, 
and not on the infringer. Just because the latter is obliged to pay more than 
“exact” compensation, this does not necessarily mean that the injured person 
is overcompensated; there is no strong link of this type because whom the 
money is paid to should also be taken into account. However, even if the 
injury was sustained by a social organisation, which applied for, and indeed 
received, an award of an adequate amount of money for its own social goal 
(apart from compensation), it would still be fair to say that the organisation 
was not being overcompensated. Such an award, despite being given directly 
to an injured party, would have, however, a different “destination” in terms 
of its function (different than compensation of an injured party as it is with 
English exemplary damages). 
2. Joint and several liability
One of the biggest changes required by the Damages Directive, at least 
with respect to Polish laws, is going to relate to joint and several liability. 
Article 11 section 1 states that “Member States shall ensure that undertakings 
which have infringed competition law through joint behaviour are jointly and 
severally liable for the harm caused by the infringement of competition law 
(…)”. Polish laws contain no particular legal basis for joint and several liability 
of co-infringers of competition law. A general legal basis can now be found in 
Article 441 § 1 of the Civil Code57 which stipulates that if several persons are 
liable for harm caused by tort, their liability shall be joint and several58. The 
concept of “unity of harm” is a prerequisite for joint and several liability59. This 
feature exists if the harm is indivisible by its nature, that is, committing the 
same tort by co-infringers is interrelated with the indivisibility of consequences 
resulted from it. Such “unity of harm” exists where it results from the joint 
operation of harmful factors so that it is impossible to distinguish which factor 
caused/ contributed to what part of the harm. It is up to the circumstances of 
the case to determine that in order for the harm to appear, harmful factors 
had to coexist. The implementation of Article 11 section 1 of the Damages 
56 Consolidated text Journal of Laws of 2003 No. 153, item 1503, as amended.
57 Consolidated text Journal of Laws 2014, item 121, as amended. 
58 See also P. Podrecki, “Civil Law Actions in the Context of Competition Restricting 
Practices under Polish Law” (2009) 2(2) YARS 87. 
59 Supreme Court judgment of 20.11.2002 in Case II CKN 859/00.
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Directive into Polish laws will certainly clarify whether liability for competition 
law infringements is joint and several. Such a provision will also not be 
regarded as a “strange” legal transplant. 
To say the same of the implementation into Polish laws of Article 11 
section 2 of the Damages Directive may be somewhat less grounded. This 
provision was inserted into the draft almost at the last minute. Referring 
to the limitations of joint and several liability of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), it constitutes a kind of de minimis rule. Member States 
shall ensure that where the infringer is a SME, it shall be liable only to its 
own direct and indirect purchasers under some specified conditions. Polish 
law does not know any similar limitations of civil liability. The above concept 
(the de minimis rule) seems an example of unprecedented mixture of civil 
(private) legal provisions and regulatory rules. It is not the first time for an EU 
directive to require national legislatures to intervene in private laws for some 
EU policy reasons. There is a strong case for such requirement when it comes 
to leniency applicants (which will be discussed below). It is understandable 
that a limitation of civil liability of leniency applicants60 (despite being at 
the same time a limitation for private antitrust enforcement) may create an 
incentive for companies to cooperate with competition authorities. As such, it 
might considerably improve the efficiency of public antitrust enforcement. But 
is there any solid rationale behind the limitations of civil liability of SMEs? 
The economic importance of micro-enterprises and SMEs is unquestionable; 
on the other hand, one of their main problems is often their lack of knowledge 
about competition rules. However, tinkering with their civil liability does not 
seem an appropriate form of public support for SMEs. For economic reasons, 
however important they might be, EU institutions are improving the situation 
of some SMEs. Yet at the same time, they may make it far more difficult for 
injured persons to get compensation61, including injured entities such as other 
SMEs and even weaker market participants such as consumers etc. The above 
de minimis rule on joint and several liability is simply favouring some SMEs. 
60 According to Howard, it is a sensible reinforcement to the attractiveness of the leniency 
regime; A. Howard, “Too little, too late? The European Commission’s Legislative Proposals on 
Anti-Trust Damages Actions” (2013) 4(6) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 458.
61 A similar concern was expressed by Kersting with respect to the limitation of civil liability 
of leniency applicants (“While it does generally make sense to privilege successful leniency 
applicants with regard to their civil liability, it is problematic to do so at the expense of the 
injured parties. (…) According to Article 11(2) some victims can only claim compensation from 
successful immunity applicants if they prove that they cannot obtain full compensation from 
the other cartelists. This puts a significant burden on them which renders their right to full 
compensation less effective.”); see Ch. Kersting, “Removing the Tension Between Public and 
Private Enforcement: Disclosure and Privileges for Successful Leniency Applicants” (2014) 5(1) 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 4. 
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It is worth mentioning, however, that it will not be easy for SMEs to meet the 
conditions stipulated in Article 11 section 2 (and, first of all, to even interpret 
them62). One of the conditions is that “the application of the normal rules 
of joint and several liability would irretrievably jeopardize its [enterprise’s] 
economic viability and cause its assets to lose all their value”. A difficulty will 
probably be hidden in the adjective “all”. It will not be easy for a SME to 
prove that all its assets would lose their entire value if normal liability rules 
were applied. 
Another challenge for the Polish legislature will be to implement Article 11 
section 3 of the Damages Directive, which relates to limitations of joint and 
several liability of leniency applicants and, more precisely, immunity recipients. 
Pursuant to Article 4(19) of the Damages Directive, the term “‘immunity 
recipient’ means an undertaking or a natural person which has been granted 
immunity from fines by a competition authority under a leniency programme”. 
It does not cover undertakings and persons who have been granted a partial 
fine reduction. Leniency programmes are defined in Article 4(15) of the 
Damages Directive as “a programme concerning the application of Article 
101 TFEU or a corresponding provision under national law on the basis of 
which a participant in a secret cartel, independently of the other undertakings 
involved in the cartel, cooperates with an investigation of the competition 
authority (…)”. Finally, the term cartel shall be understood here as an 
agreement or concerted practice between two or more competitors63. Recital 
34 of the Preamble to the Damages Directive clarifies that it is appropriate to 
protect immunity recipients from undue exposure to damages claims because 
they „play a key role in detecting secret cartel infringements and in bringing 
these infringements to an end, thereby often mitigating the harm which could 
have been caused had the infringement continued”. However, as Schwab 
rightly observed, it is hard to diagnose “undue exposure to damages claims” 
seeing as so far no evidence has come to light to suggest that the proposed 
Directive will lead to immunity recipients being the first, or only target to be 
sued64. 
Pursuant to Article 11 section 3 of the Damages Directive “(…) Member 
States shall ensure that an immunity recipient is jointly and severally liable: 
(a) to its direct or indirect purchasers or providers; and (b) to other injured 
parties only where full compensation cannot be obtained from the other 
62 Member States will need almost technical guidance on a wide range of issues relating 
to those conditions. 
63 Art. 4(14) of the Damages Directive. 
64 A. Schwab, “Finding the Right Balance – the Deliberations of the European Parliament on 
the Draft Legislation Regarding Damage Claims” (2014) 5(2) Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice 66. 
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undertakings that were involved in the same infringement of competition 
law (…)”. As Howard rightly asked with regard to the first wording of the 
liability privilege (where words “are unable” were used instead of “cannot”), in 
what circumstances will it be “impossible” for claimants to obtain compensation 
from other infringers65? It is unclear whether “cannot” refers to a legal ban 
(prohibition) or a practical impediment (such as one of the infringers going 
into liquidation) or both. 
There are apparent tendencies of the EU and its Member States to converge 
in many areas of competition law and many national antitrust concepts closely 
resemble their EU prototypes. Nevertheless, the Polish leniency programme, 
set out in the 2007 Competition and Consumers Protection Act66, differs 
from its EU equivalent to a considerable extent. First and foremost, an 
important dimension of Polish leniency is that it refers not only to cartels but 
also to other agreements (and practices), including vertical agreements. This 
particular discrepancy will remain even after the recent amendment of the 
Polish programme, which is going to come into effect as of 18.01.2015 (the 
amendment introduces another variant of leniency, namely the leniency plus 
programme). So, what should be the scope of the rule implementing Article 
11 section 3 of the Damages Directive? Shall the Polish legislature extend it 
beyond those cartel participants that have received immunity from fines? 
The discussed provision is specifically “tailored” to cartel participants. It 
is not impossible, however, for a participant in a secret vertical agreement 
covered by Article 101 TFEU (as well as the Polish Competition Act of 2007) 
to report an infringement to the Polish NCA under its leniency programme. 
Such entity shall be granted immunity from antitrust fines but not from 
normal (regular) joint and several liability. In fact, this is an excellent 
opportunity to ask: do NCAs need such leniency applications? Do “non-cartel” 
infringers deserve incentives and privileges similar to those granted to cartel 
participants? After all, it can be argued that cartel practices (to which the 
liability privilege is attached) are much more dangerous to market competition 
than other anticompetitive agreements. Still, the possibility of extending the 
liability privilege to cover non-cartel leniency applicants seems doubtful. 
Article 11 section 3 of the Damages Directive seems to be conceived as 
a  full harmonisation clause (rather than a minimum harmonisation clause). 
It does not involve expressions such as “at least”67, “wider”68 or any other 
word that would suggest that Member States can extend the scope of the 
65 A. Howard, “Too little…”, op. cit., p. 458.
66 Competition and Consumers Protection Act of 16 February 2007 (Journal of Laws 2007 
No. 50, item 331, as amended). 
67 See Art. 9 section 2, Art. 10 section 3.
68 See Art. 5 section 8. 
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liability privilege (and establish a higher standard of protection of entities 
cooperating with competition authorities). Of course, Member States are free 
to do this with respect to competition law infringements of a purely national 
scope. However, it seems much more rational for Member States to have 
identical, or almost identical, solutions with respect to infringements of EU 
and national antitrust rules. Putting it colloquially, if we dig dipper and look 
wider, we shall notice that perhaps it is too early for the harmonisation of the 
liability privilege seeing as Member States are allowed to maintain differences 
with respect to national leniency programmes. 
3. Effect of national antitrust decisions
Last but not least, the effect of national antirust decisions on private antitrust 
enforcement is an example of a solution where the Council and the Parliament 
have somewhat decided that one “size” cannot fit all, despite the fact that the 
Commission was initially of a different opinion. EU institutions gave a proper 
consideration to a range of options in this context. First, the Commission’s 
version of the draft Damages Directive of June 2013 repeated the scheme of 
Article 16 of Regulation 1/200369. Accordingly, Article 9 sentence 1 of the 
draft Damages Directive stated originally that: “Member States shall ensure 
that, where national courts rule, in actions for damages under Article 101 or 
102 of the Treaty or under national competition law, on agreements, decisions 
or practices which are already the subject of a final infringement decision by 
a national competition authority or by a review court, those courts cannot 
take decisions running counter to such finding of an infringement”. The 
draft provided therefore for a (German-like) cross-border binding effect of 
national antitrust decisions. However, national judiciaries tend to enjoy much 
discretion with regard to findings contained in infringement decisions adopted 
in other Member States. Many of them leave no room for any schemes other 
than the non-cross-border binding effect of national decisions (e.g. England 
and Wales)70. Importantly, it was not until 2005 that Germany introduced 
cross-border binding effect of national antitrust decisions into its Act against 
Restraints of Competition, amongst some other important innovations 
affecting the national system of private antitrust enforcement. 
The German “product” was not desired to be taken as an EU-wide model. 
After works in the Council, Article 9 of the draft Damages Directive was 
transformed in November 2013; the authors of the revised draft introduced 
69 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.01.2003).
70 See also A. Howard, “Too little…”, op. cit., p. 457. 
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a double standard in two separate sections concerning – respectively – the 
non-cross-border and the cross-border effect of national decisions. Emphasis 
was placed on the probative effect of national decisions instead of their 
binding effect. Section 1 sentence 1 argued that “Member States shall ensure 
that an infringement of competition law found by a final decision of a national 
competition authority or a review court is deemed to be irrefutably established 
for the purposes of an action for damages brought before their national courts 
under Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty or under national competition law”. 
Instead of the requirement that court rulings cannot run counter to a finding 
of an infringement, the new Article 9 section 1 provided for an irrefutable 
(irrebuttable, absolute) presumption of an infringement. With respect to 
the cross-border effect of national decisions, Article 9 section 2 stated that 
“Member States shall ensure that a final decision (…) given in another Member 
State can be presented before their national courts as evidence, among other, 
of the fact that an infringement of competition law has occurred”. 
The newest version of Article 9 of the Damages Directive, ultimately 
adopted by the Parliament in April 2014, differs from the one of November 
2013 in that in section 2 it says that “Member States shall ensure that a final 
decision (…) given in another Member State may, in accordance with their 
respective national law, be presented before their national courts as at least 
prima facie evidence that an infringement of competition law has occurred 
and, as appropriate, may be assessed along with any other material brought by 
the parties”. Article 9 section 2 constitutes a minimum harmonisation clause 
that accounts for an “at least half-probative” cross-border effect of national 
antitrust decisions. 
It seems that the reason for such clause lies in the fear of the differences 
existing in some procedural standards between Member States. It might 
therefore happen that a Member State would be bound by a “foreign” (other 
Member State) decision adopted in circumstances in which such decision 
would not have been adopted in this Member State. In the draft report on 
the proposal for the Damages Directive, the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs in the European Parliament argued that “the binding effect 
shall not apply in cases where obvious errors occurred during the investigation 
of facts or where the rights of the defendant were not duly respected during 
the procedure before the national competition authority or competition 
court”71. However, taking this into account, EU institutions decided not to 
declare that decisions of other EU NCAs’ may be non-binding in all Member 
States. They gave Member States a choice whether they want their courts 
71 Draft Report of 3.10.2013, available http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-516.968+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&langu 
age=EN, p. 37 (1.08.2014).
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to be: 1) bound by those decisions; 2) governed in their assessments by an 
irrefutable or rebuttable presumption; 3) obliged to treat them as a piece of 
evidence and to freely assess their weight and probative value; 4) obliged to 
treat them as prima facie evidence. Member States that have one of these 
solutions in place already shall be considered as complying with Article 9 
section 2 of the Damages Directive. 
Polish civil procedure law recognises only the binding effect of criminal 
court rulings, but not of decisions issued by administrative bodies (such as 
NCAs). Whereas, for instance, in civil cases, courts are bound by findings 
of a criminal court ruling regarding bid-rigging, at the same time they may 
be presented with an administrative decision as only evidence which may be 
assessed along with any other material brought by the parties72. Polish law has 
no provisions on the binding effect of decisions of NCAs, not even with respect 
to the Polish NCA, let alone those of other Member States. It is worth adding 
that jurisprudence thereon has so far not been uniform73. 
Hypothetically speaking, Poland seems to be in a tabula rasa situation 
and free to select one of above-mentioned competing solutions. Should the 
legislator choose the minimal solution in the form of prima facie evidence? 
If so, this approach would face a fundamental difficulty. So far, prima facie 
evidence has not been codified in Polish civil procedure at all. In fact, it 
has been used by courts in cases concerning injuries that occurred during 
medical treatment74. The first central difficulty here is that neither judges nor 
scholars are unanimous on what prima facie evidence is in Polish legal culture. 
Some argue that it is similar to the de facto presumption (Article 231 of the 
Civil Procedure Code75). Others believe that prima facie evidence makes the 
existence of certain facts only plausible76. 
72 See resolutions of the Supreme Court of resolutions of 16.06.1994, Case II PZP 4/94, and 
of 9.10.2007, Case III CZP 46/07.
73 A. Jurkowska-Gomułka, “W stronę umocnienia prywatnoprawnego wdrażania zakazów 
praktyk ograniczających konkurencję – glosa do uchwały SN z 23.07.2008 r. (III CZP 52/08)” 
(2010) 5 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 43-48; A. Piszcz, “Still-unpopular Sanctions: Developments 
in Private Antitrust Enforcement in Poland After the 2008 White Paper” (2012) 5(7) YARS 
62-66; A. Piszcz, “What type of sanctions? Prospects of private enforcement of EU competition 
law in Poland” [in:] Proceedings of the 55th International Scientific Conference of Daugavpils 
University, Daugavpils Universitāte Akadēmiskais Apgāds “Saule”, Daugavpils 2014, pp. 602–603; 
M. Sieradzka, “Dochodzenie roszczeń za naruszenie unijnych i krajowych reguł konkurencji 
a kwestie prejudycjalności rozstrzygnięć organów ochrony konkurencji” (2010) 12 Przegląd 
Prawa Handlowego 51-53.
74 See M. Białkowski, “Dowód prima facie w postępowaniu cywilnym dotyczącym szkód 
powstałych w związku z leczeniem” (2014) 3-4 Palestra 115-125.
75 Consolidated text Journal of Laws of 2014, item 101, as amended; (hereafter: CPC).
76 See Art. 243 CPC.
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Which national approach should be taken as a model for the interpretation 
of the notion of prima facie evidence in light of the Damages Directive (how 
is this notion construed in other Member States)? Its interpretation as making 
the existence of a given fact plausible would have large practical consequences. 
The creation of a legal rule whereby decisions issued by other EU NCAs 
make an infringement of competition law plausible will not improve the 
claimants’ position. To do so, such rule would have to be accompanied by 
a provision stating that making an infringement plausible is sufficient, without 
the need of evidence. Otherwise, decisions of other EU NCAs’ would only 
be a “beginning of the proof” and eventually, an infringement of competition 
law would have to be proven. From this point of view, one could imagine 
that the version of Article 9 section 2 that was devised in November 2013, 
which left no room for such doubts, would be much easier to comply with by 
all Member States. 
It could certainly be argued that the Polish legislator does not have to 
choose the minimal solution, especially considering it seems so troublesome 
from the perspective of the national legal system. The highest standard solution 
(German-like) might be chosen instead or one of the options in-between. Of 
course, this is the quintessential advantage of the “minimum” harmonisation 
approach. However, this analysis leads to one far-reaching question. Is Article 
9 section 2 of the Damages Directive going to contribute to the phenomenon 
of forum shopping77? Is it capable of producing such a side effect? If claimants 
had at their disposal a final infringement decision adopted by any EU NCA, 
then, from the perspective of the effects of such decision, they would favour 
jurisdictions where courts are bound by such decisions. Going to a national 
judiciary that may freely assess the weight and probative value of such decisions 
would risk that an infringement might ultimately not be proven. It is likely 
that such situation will follow the transposition of the Damages Directive into 
national laws. However, harmonisation efforts were not meant to promote or 
encourage forum shopping and yet EU institutions must be prepared for it if 
considerable legal differences among the Member States remain. It is fair to 
be concerned how the different rules of the 28 Member States will provide 
for legal certainty for parties in cross-border litigations.
77 This phenomenon is analysed in many aspects in: J. Basedow, S. Francq, L. Idot, 
International Antitrust Litigation: Conflict of Laws and Coordination, Hart Publishing, Oxfrod– 
–Portland 2012, pp. 6–7, 46–47, 52–53, 409–410 etc.
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IV. Conclusions
In recent years, private antitrust enforcement has been one of the primary 
concerns of public discussions in the EU forum. The Recommendation and 
the Damages Directive will not automatically improve efficiency of private 
antitrust enforcement in Europe – they need to be implemented first. Their 
transposition will require Member States to conduct an intensive scrutiny 
of legal areas such as civil law, procedural law and competition law. Private 
antitrust enforcement is thus going to become a more highly regulated and 
codified field in EU Member States. 
It was argued, on the basis of Polish experiences, that contingency fees with 
reasonable legal boundaries may be helpful in case of opt-in group proceedings, 
especially if the use of this instrument is diminishing. The Portuguese experience 
clearly suggests that the PA mechanism is potentially important. The existing 
model strengthens access to justice and effective redress, even if the current 
framework retains many limitations: scarce resources of consumer associations 
(contingency fee arrangements or pactum de quota litis fees are prohibited in 
Portugal), length of the proceedings, and uncertainties surrounding certain 
aspects of the PA, which may be clarified by juridical interpretation in the likely 
event that the PAA will not be revised in the near future78. 
Furthermore, the Recommendation is not binding on EU Member States 
– it states that Member States can follow a different solution as long as it 
is justified. Only time will thus tell to what an extent will collective redress 
mechanisms be adopted throughout the EU. It remains to be seen also if there 
is a risk that Member States’ solutions will differ to a large extent in terms of 
their effectiveness.
The Damages Directive, as a legally binding act, is of different nature. 
Member States will have to transpose it into their national legal systems. 
However, the above analysis of selected issues (prohibition of overcompensation, 
joint and several liability, effect of national decisions) shows that 28 national 
solutions create a puzzle that can pose difficulties when being harmonised 
according to the EU model. This is so especially because the latter is imperfect 
to some extent also. Some reservations can be expressed as to the use of 
minimum harmonisation clauses and the full harmonisation approach. It can 
be expected that literature will provide extensive critical commentary to some 
solutions provided in the Damages Directive. 
78 There are particularly doubts concerning the decision and distribution of total 
compensation, which can be solved by the courts, applying the legal techniques of interpretations. 
This solution seems the most likely in the near future, although some voices suggest that 
“it would be useful if the PAA were revised”, see Rossi – Ferro, op. cit., pp. 77–78.
